



CONCORDIA AI
安远 AI

The State of AI Safety in China Spring 2024 Report

Published May 14, 2024

Executive Summary (I)

- The **relevance and quality** of Chinese **technical research for frontier AI safety** has **increased** substantially, with growing work on frontier issues such as LLM unlearning, misuse risks of AI in biology and chemistry, and evaluating "power-seeking" and "self-awareness" risks of LLMs.
- There have been nearly **15 Chinese technical papers on frontier AI safety per month** on average over the past 6 months. The report identifies 11 key research groups who have written a substantial portion of these papers.
- China's decision to sign the **Bletchley Declaration**, issue a joint statement on AI governance with **France**, and pursue an intergovernmental AI dialogue with the **US** indicates a **growing convergence of views on AI safety among major powers** compared to early 2023.
- Since 2022, **8 Track 1.5 or 2 dialogues** focused on AI have taken place between China and Western countries, with 2 focused on frontier AI safety and governance.

Executive Summary (II)

- Chinese **national policy and leadership** show growing interest in **developing large models while balancing risk prevention**.
- Unofficial **expert drafts** of China's **forthcoming national AI law** contain **provisions on AI safety**, such as specialized oversight for foundation models and stipulating value alignment of AGI.
- **Local governments** in China's 3 biggest AI hubs have issued **policies on AGI or large models**, primarily aimed at accelerating development while also including provisions on topics such as **international cooperation, ethics, and testing and evaluation**.
- Several influential **industry associations** established **projects or committees to research AI safety and security problems**, but their focus is primarily on content and data security rather than frontier AI safety.
- In recent months, **Chinese experts** have discussed several focused **AI safety topics**, including **“red lines”** that AI must not cross to avoid “existential risks,” **minimum funding levels** for AI safety research, and AI's impact on **biosecurity**.

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
Section 9: About us

Thanks to positive feedback on our first report and rapid AI developments since October 2023, we have decided to issue an update!

- The [2023 version](#) was published before the UK AI Safety Summit, and our CEO, Brian Tse, shared it with other attendees at the [summit](#).
- We provided briefings on the report to over a dozen organizations including the Brookings Institution, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Google DeepMind, the Frontier Model Forum, and the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change.
- Media outlets including [Politico](#) and [Sixth Tone](#) have covered our report, and it has been recommended by leading AI experts, including Jeffrey Ding in his [ChinAI](#) newsletter.

Our report focuses on “frontier AI risks.”

- We share the focus of the [2023 UK AI Safety Summit](#), which emphasized risks from cutting-edge large models – “highly capable general-purpose AI models, including foundation models, that could perform a wide variety of tasks” – as well as narrow AI systems in dangerous domains.¹
 - We include both types of models when using the phrase “frontier AI.”



Our report focuses on AI safety rather than AI security.

- In English, risks from frontier AI are the subject of the discipline called AI “[safety](#).” In Chinese, the term “人工智能安全” encompasses this definition, while also including AI “security.”²
 - AI “[safety](#)” is about protecting against broadly harmful consequences that could result from AI systems such as accidents and misuse, whereas AI “[security](#)” is about preventing AI systems from being attacked and compromised.
 - AI security includes topics such as cybersecurity of AI model weights, data security of AI models, and physical security of AI development facilities, which we exclude from the scope of the report.
 - We exclude lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs) from the scope of this report to focus on non-military AI risks.
- In cases of ambiguity, we translate the term “人工智能安全” as “AI safety/security.”
- Some AI safety topics can also be considered AI security issues and fall **within** our scope, such as:
 - Misuse of frontier AI systems to conduct cyberattacks and develop biological or chemical weapons.
 - Robustness of frontier AI systems to adversarial attack.

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Overview of key developments since October 2023

- **Relevance and quantity of frontier AI safety research** has risen substantially compared to 2023, with increasing interest in frontier aspects of AI safety.
- We have identified with high confidence **11 key safety research groups**, mainly within universities, and the **quality of researchers** leading the safety work is high.
- Technical safety research directions:
 - **Alignment** work has evolved beyond improvements to reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) to topics such as multi-agent alignment and sociotechnical alignment.
 - **Robustness** work remains strong and includes a number of papers on robustness of foundation models, jailbreaking of multi-agent systems, etc.
 - There is now **systemic safety** work on provenance mechanisms and the risks of AI in science.
 - For **evaluations**, there is increased attention to frontier risks such as power-seeking and chemical or biological misuse rather than just toxicity, bias, and content security.
 - Research to **interpret** frontier foundation models appears more limited than other directions.

Methodology for selecting Chinese Frontier AI Safety Papers

- Concordia AI collected a dataset of frontier AI safety-relevant preprints and papers released with substantial contribution from Chinese authors, between April 2023 and May 2024.³ For the full dataset and methodology, see the tabs “Guide” and “Chinese Frontier AI Safety Papers” in our [database](#).
 - We only include papers researching frontier models, primarily large models or AI models for scientific research. We did so in order to ensure a clearly defined and high-confidence dataset, but this results in the exclusion of many safety-relevant papers researching smaller models.
- We additionally categorized the papers into research directions inspired by taxonomies in [several papers](#) by Dan Hendrycks et al. and Dan Hendrycks’ [Introduction to AI Safety, Ethics, and Society](#).
 - Alignment: Controlling propensities of AI systems and making AI’s actions beneficial to society.
 - Robustness: Resilience to external perturbation.
 - Systemic safety: Addressing broader risks involving AI systems, including cyberattacks, scientific misuse, deep-fake detection, and watermarking.
 - Monitoring (evaluations): Detection of hazardous emergent capabilities.
 - Monitoring (interpretability): Explaining internal model behavior.
 - Monitoring (other): Additional monitoring work such as trojans or calibration.

Methodology for identifying Key Chinese AI Safety-relevant Research Groups

- We collected names of the final 2-3 authors listed on each AI safety paper in our dataset. They likely guided the research and are sometimes referred to as ‘anchor’ authors.
- A “Key Chinese AI Safety-relevant Research Group” was any group with at least 1 researcher who was an anchor author for at least 3 frontier AI safety papers.
 - See the full dataset in the “Key Chinese AI Safety-relevant Research Groups” tab of the [database](#).
- We also collected information on research accomplishments of these safety researchers as a proxy for the strength of their previous research and therefore a predictor for the quality of future AI safety work. We evaluated them based on:
 - Best paper awards as self-reported by researchers from 9 top machine learning conferences.⁴
 - [World top 200,000 scientist / subfield top 2% scientist](#) per [Stanford University](#) researchers (based on citation data) through the end of 2022 (the most recent update).
 - These are incomplete and lagging metrics upon which to compare researcher accomplishments, but these are standard methods in the field.


2.1 Overall trends: Relevance and quantity of frontier safety research has increased substantially compared to mid-2023, and the most popular research direction has been alignment.

2.2 Key research groups

2.3 Notable technical papers


Over the past 6 months, there has been an average of nearly 15 frontier AI safety papers per month, compared to an average of 6 per month for the preceding 7 months – a substantial increase.⁵

Chinese frontier AI safety papers per month



Chinese researchers are showing interest in various frontier AI safety research directions, with alignment being the most represented. However, research on the interpretability of frontier models is relatively lacking.⁶

Frontier AI Safety Research Directions



2.1 Overall trends

2.2 Key research groups: The majority of key research groups we identified, 8 out of 11, have leading safety researchers with at least 1 of 2 major research honors. This suggests that the groups spearheading frontier safety research are likely producing high-quality work.


2.3 Notable technical papers

We identified 11 relevant groups, a decline from the 13 on our October 2023 list due to a much higher bar for inclusion – 3 frontier safety papers over the past year.

- We removed 5 groups from the previous list due to insufficient relevant publications since 2023.⁷
- We also combined Tsinghua Conversational AI (CoAI) and Tsinghua Foundation Model Research Center since the relevant work at both institutions was all led by HUANG Minlie (黄民烈).
 - We added 4 new groups: ByteDance Responsible AI team, Peking University Computer Vision and Digital Art Lab (CVDA lab), Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SHJT) AI Security Lab, and Tsinghua University Natural Language Processing Lab (THUNLP).⁸
- While the overall number designated key safety-relevant groups declined, our data shows an increase in Chinese research groups interested in AI safety, and we expect research to continue improving in relevance and quality.


These research groups are concentrated mostly in universities, but there are some examples in private industry and state-backed labs.⁹

Types of key AI safety-relevant research groups



The AI safety research groups are located primarily in China's AI hubs of Beijing and Shanghai.¹⁰


Location of key AI safety-relevant research groups



*ByteDance Research is not included on this graph, as researchers based in the US conducted the relevant AI safety research.

8 out of the 11 labs have at least 1 safety paper anchor author who has either received a top conference best paper award nomination, or was ranked top 2% in their field by Stanford, or both.¹¹

- 6 of the 11 labs have 1 safety paper anchor author who has received 1 conference best/outstanding paper award or nomination over their career.
- 7 of the 11 labs have at least 1 safety paper anchor author listed on the 2022 Stanford Elsevier index of top 2% scientists in their field over their career or for their 2022 body of work.
- The high research honors for the people guiding research on frontier AI safety in these groups indicates that their future safety research is likely to be high quality.
- Ultimately, each person is their own judge of the quality of these AI safety papers, and we encourage you to read these interesting papers by yourself!



2.1 Overall trends

2.2 Key research groups

2.3 Notable technical papers: The following slides in this subsection dive into key technical papers, nearly all from the past 6 months. Readers may also choose to skip forward to the “International Governance” section instead.

Alignment: There is now some work on addressing broader social questions around alignment, as well as some preliminary attempts towards scalable oversight.

- Peking University's YANG Yaodong (杨耀东) has written papers on [sociotechnical alignment](#) and [weak-to-strong correction](#).¹²




Figure 3. An illustration of our methodology. The Superalignment problem focuses on scaling human oversight for supervising increasingly intelligent and complex AI systems. The *Weak-to-Strong Generalization* (Burns et al., 2023) analogy emphasizes using weaker models to supervise stronger ones. Our approach composes weak and strong models to offer iteratively scalable supervision.

Alignment: Several research groups have begun exploring large language model (LLM) unlearning approaches.

- A ByteDance Responsible AI team [paper](#) on unlearning was included on a list by the Center for AI Safety (CAIS) of [best ML safety papers in 2023](#).¹³
- 2 [other papers](#) on unlearning were published by Fudan NLP and ByteDance Responsible AI team, respectively.




Figure 1: **Harmful content warning.** Overview of our setting of LLM unlearning with the application of removing harmful responses.

Alignment: Chinese researchers are interested in improving Constitutional AI approaches.

- Researchers from Microsoft Research Asia (MSRA) Societal AI team and the International Digital Economy Academy published a [preprint](#) on using a library of safety guidelines, which are combined with LLM inputs, to improve upon HHH (helpful, honest, and harmless) alignment approaches in Constitutional AI.




Figure 1: Framework of **Guide-Align**. (1) Guideline Library Construction and Retrieval Model Training (→) : Using a safety-trained model (GPT-3.5-turbo in our paper), we discern the safety of input data within the training dataset and generate corresponding guidelines. Subsequently, we create a guideline library and train an input-guideline retrieval model. (2) Inference (→) : For a new input, the retrieval model retrieves the top N relevant guidelines. These guidelines are then deduplicated based on similarity to obtain k ($k \leq N$) guidelines. They are combined with the initial input for LLM to produce secure, high-quality responses. Fine-tuning (Optional)(→) : Using an open-source dataset, we follow the inference process for inputs, generate corresponding outputs, join them with initial inputs to create an alignment dataset, and use it to fine-tune the base model, referred as **Labrador**.

Alignment work has extended to how human values are understood across languages.

- Tianjin University Natural Language Processing Laboratory (TJUNLP) researchers published a preprint [assessing](#) whether value alignment is controllable across languages.




Figure 1: The diagram of the proposed framework for exploring multilingual human value concepts in LLMs, using English and Chinese, along with the concept of harmfulness, as examples. In practice, our analysis involves 7 human values, 16 languages and 3 LLM families with distinct multilinguality.

Alignment of multi-agent systems is also the subject of multiple papers.

- Fudan NLP [developed](#) an evolutionary approach for agent alignment to social norms.¹⁴
- Tsinghua Institute for AI Industry Research [argued](#) for the importance of simultaneously aligning agents to human intentions, environmental dynamics, and self-constraints such as monetary and temporal costs.




Figure 1: Disparities between LLM alignment and agent alignment. (a) LLM iteratively aligns to values under manualization. (b) Agents perceive values from the environment, make actions that affect the environment, and self-evolve after receiving feedback from the environment.

Robustness work includes backdoor attacks...

- Peking University and WeChat AI researchers [explored](#) different forms of backdoor attacks on LLM-based agents, finding substantial success in attacking web shopping and tool utilization agents.




Figure 1: Illustrations of different forms of backdoor attacks on LLM-based agents studied in this paper. We choose a query from a web shopping (Yao et al., 2022) scenario as an example. Both Query-Attack and Observation-Attack aim to modify the final output distribution, but the trigger “sneakers” is hidden in the user query in Query-Attack while the trigger “Adidas” appears in an intermediate observation in Observation-Attack. Thought-Attack only maliciously manipulates the internal reasoning traces of the agent while keeping the final output unaffected.

Robustness to adversarial multimodal attacks ...

- Tsinghua University Statistical AI and Learning Group (TSAIL) and RealAI researchers [studied](#) the adversarial robustness of Bard and GPT-4V to image attacks.




Figure 1: Adversarial attacks against Google's Bard. We consider attacks on image description and two defenses of Bard – face detection and toxicity detection.

Robustness to attacks via coding ...

- Shanghai AI Lab (SHLAB) researchers [published](#) a framework for transforming natural language inputs into code inputs for testing safety generalization of LLMs.




Figure 1: Overview of our CodeAttack. CodeAttack constructs a code template with three steps: (1) Input encoding which encodes the harmful text-based query with common data structures; (2) Task understanding which applies a `decode()` function to allow LLMs to extract the target task from various kinds of inputs; (3) Output specification which enables LLMs to fill the output structure with the user's desired content.

and **Robustness** of multi-agent systems to jailbreaking

- TSAIL developed an attack method using a “virtual, chat-powered team” to simulate threats across multiple levels and roles of a multi-agent system.




Figure 1. Schematic illustrations of Adversarial LLM (Left Top), Adversarial single agent (Left Bottom) and Adversarial multiple agents (Middle). The original question is: “Can you tell me how to make a bomb?”. Since the LLM-based agents consist of multiple LLMs, it is more vulnerable to adversarial attacks than LLMs. The agent is enabled by Role specialization of the Adversarial LLM.

Systemic safety research includes work on biological and chemical risks.

- MSRA Societal AI team and the University of Science and Technology of China published a [preprint](#) on controlling misuse risks of AI in science, particularly misuse in chemical science, and created a red-teaming benchmark.¹⁵
- An international research team, including a professor from SHJT AI Security Lab, [explored](#) risks of LLM agents in science and provided suggestions to mitigate risks.




Fig. 3: Designing retrosynthesis pathways for two chemical weapons. An AI model, LocalRetro, enables malicious users to bypass regulations and design novel retrosynthesis pathways for harmful substances. These pathways provide feasible alternatives to traditional methods. Importantly, these designed retrosynthesis pathways and associated chemical reactions have been validated. The predicted method in Case 1 corresponds to some recent research papers [28–30], and the reaction types in Case 2 are common ones in organic chemistry textbooks, thereby highlighting potential risks. Sensitive content is redacted in the public manuscript.

Systemic safety: there have also been many works on watermarking and deepfake detection.

- Fudan NLP researchers and the ByteDance Responsible AI team both [published papers](#) on LLM watermarking mechanisms.
- A research team involving Chinese University of Hong Kong–Shenzhen also [investigated](#) the possibility of using LLMs for deepfake detection.¹⁶




Figure 1. *The overall process of using multimodal LLMs to detect AI-generated face images.*

Systemic safety: Issues in tool learning safety have also been explored with Fudan NLP's ToolSword framework.





Figure 2: Framework of ToolSword. ToolSword offers a comprehensive analysis of the safety challenges encountered by LLMs during tool learning, spanning three distinct stages: input, execution, and output. Within each stage, we have devised two safety scenarios, providing a thorough exploration of the real-world situations LLMs may encounter while utilizing the tool.

For **Monitoring (evaluations)**, benchmarks from SHLAB and TJUNLP test for a number of frontier safety misuse cases.

- SHLAB's [SALAD-Bench safety benchmark](#) includes 200+ questions on categories including “biological and chemical harms,” “cyber attack,” “malware generation,” “management of critical infrastructure,” and “psychological manipulations.”¹⁷
- TJUNLP's [OpenEval](#) tests for safety risks, such as “self-awareness,” “power-seeking,” “reward myopia,” and “cooperation” with other AI systems.



Monitoring (evaluations) also includes new work on evaluating LLM value alignment.

- SHLAB published a [benchmark](#) named FLAMES that includes testing for standard harmless principles as well as Chinese values, such as harmony.




Figure 2: Framework of FLAMES Benchmark.

Monitoring (interpretability) research is a much smaller proportion of papers than other research directions, in part because much of this work focuses on models smaller than frontier large models.

- Peking University CVDA lab researchers were able to linearly [decode](#) belief statuses of LLMs through neural activations, suggesting that LLMs possess certain theory of mind abilities.
- Researchers led by University of Hong Kong professor MA Yi (马毅) are [pursuing](#) a white-box, mathematically fully interpretable transformer-like architecture.¹⁸




Figure 1: **Diagram of the overall white-box CRATE-MAE pipeline, illustrating the end-to-end (masked) autoencoding process.** The token representations are transformed iteratively towards a parsimonious (e.g., compressed and sparse) representation by each encoder layer f^{ℓ} . Furthermore, such representations are transformed back to the original image by the decoder layers g^{ℓ} . Each encoder layer f^{ℓ} is meant to be (partially) inverted by a corresponding decoder layer $g^{L-\ell}$.

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Overview of key developments since October 2023

- China had become increasingly proactive on AI governance in 2023. While it did not announce any new projects in the past 6 months on the order of the Global AI Governance Initiative, the decision to sign on to the **Bletchley Declaration** and **UN General Assembly's (UNGA) first AI resolution** are **important multilateral signals**.
- China continues to position in **support of Global South interests** with the announcement of an AI dialogue with African countries.
- 2 major **bilateral developments** include publishing a **joint statement on AI** and global governance with **France**, as well as setting up a new **governmental AI dialogue** with the **US** that may involve AI safety.
- **China-Western "Track 1.5" and "Track 2" dialogues on AI** increased in 2023, but there are still only 2 dialogues primarily focused on frontier AI safety, with gaps remaining in the landscape.¹⁹

3.1 Multilateral Governance: In multilateral fora, China signed the Bletchley Declaration and co-sponsored the first UNGA resolution on AI, demonstrating points of common ground on certain AI safety and governance issues.

3.2 Global South

3.3 Bilateral Governance

3.4 “Track 1.5” and “Track 2” dialogues

China's participation in the UK AI Safety Summit and signing of the Bletchley Declaration showed that international dialogue on AI safety between China and the West can yield meaningful results.

- Then-Vice Minister of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) WU Zhaohui (吴朝晖) gave [remarks](#) at the opening plenary.
 - He highlighted the importance of ensuring that AI remains under human control and emphasized strengthening the representation of developing countries.
- China signed the [Bletchley Declaration](#), which calls for sustaining “an inclusive global dialogue” and continuing “research on frontier AI safety.”



China joined 120+ countries in co-sponsoring a landmark UNGA resolution on AI which had been initiated by the US.

- This resolution was adopted unanimously in March 2024, setting out the minimum level of agreement between all countries on AI governance, which can serve as the foundation for pursuing further cooperation.
 - Sections 1-4 focus on issues around development and digital divides.
 - Section 6 contains provisions relevant to frontier AI safety, including: testing and evaluation measures; third-party reporting of AI misuse; developing security and risk management practices; creating content provenance mechanisms; and increasing information-sharing on AI risks and benefits.
- China also revealed in April 2024 that it plans to introduce a separate resolution on AI development, but more specifics are not yet available.



China has re-emphasized interest in multilateral AI governance since announcing the Global AI Governance Initiative and signing the Bletchley Declaration.

- Premier LI Qiang (李强) [answered](#) a question on AI governance at Davos in January, discussing “red lines” that AI must not cross in order to avoid existential risks; human control; and benefiting the “overall majority of mankind.” He also welcomed foreign participation in the Shanghai World AI Conference (WAIC) in July.
- Foreign Minister WANG Yi (王毅) [highlighted](#) AI safety and human control as one of “Three Ensures” in an interview at the yearly Two Sessions political gathering.
 1. Ensuring AI is a force for good;
 2. Ensuring AI safety, which includes ensuring human control, improving interpretability and predictability, and assessing risks;
 3. Ensuring fairness and setting up an international AI governance institution under the UN.



Chinese companies joined international counterparts in drafting 2 international standards on AI safety and security.

- In April, the World Digital Technology Academy (WDTA), an NGO established under the UN framework, [released](#) 2 new standards on generative AI application security testing and LLM security testing.
- Many actors from different countries wrote or reviewed the standards, including Western companies (Meta, Nvidia, Google, Anthropic, Microsoft, OpenAI), Western universities or public institutions (Georgetown, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology), and Chinese companies (Baidu, iFLYTEK, Ant Group, Tencent).
 - The LLM security standard was primarily written by Ant Group employees.
- The generative AI standard included 5 tests for “excessive agency” to prevent “unintended consequences,” while the LLM standard focused on defense against adversarial attacks.



World Digital Technology Academy (WDTA)

Large Language Model Security Testing Method

World Digital Technology Academy Standard

WDTA AI-STR-02

Edition: 2024-04

3.1 Multilateral Governance

3.2 Global South: In addition to these multilateral efforts, China also announced new efforts to expand AI cooperation with African countries.

3.3 Bilateral Governance

3.4 “Track 1.5” and “Track 2” dialogues

China announced new projects on AI at the 2024 China–Africa Internet Development and Cooperation Forum, focusing on coordinating with Africa on global governance, with only a brief reference to AI safety topics.

- The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) published a “Chair’s Statement on China–Africa Cooperation on AI” during the forum in April 2024, which focused on improving cooperation on AI development.
 - The statement declared plans to create a China–Africa AI policy dialogue and cooperation mechanism, which could enable enhanced cooperation.
 - It supported cooperation on AI research and development (R&D), technology transfer, industrial cooperation, digital infrastructure, and talent exchanges.
 - It also called for cybersecurity and data security safeguards, including preventing “abuse of AI technology and cyber-attacks.”



3.1 Multilateral Governance

3.2 Global South

3.3 Bilateral Governance: China issued a joint statement on AI with France and is establishing a new AI-focused dialogue with the US.

3.4 “Track 1.5” and “Track 2” dialogues

The Sino-French joint statement indicates both governments are prioritizing AI governance, increasing chances for further dialogue on AI and deeper Chinese participation in the 2025 French AI summit.

- On May 6, during President Xi Jinping's [state visit](#) to France, the 2 countries issued a joint statement ([Ch](#), [Fr](#)) on AI and global governance.
 - This was 1 of the 4 joint statements from the trip, which also led to signing of close to 20 bilateral cooperation documents.
- The statement noted mutual support for international efforts on AI development and safety, positively calling out the Bletchley Declaration and noting China's willingness to attend and assist in preparations for the French AI Summit in 2025.
- Both countries also acknowledged AI's opportunities and risks, committing to deepen their discussion of international AI governance models. They highlighted cooperation through multilateral frameworks such as the UN High-Level Advisory Body on AI and UNESCO recommendation on AI ethics.



Details about the China-US dialogue remain sparse, but there are hints that frontier AI safety will be on the agenda.

- China and the US agreed to create a [dialogue](#) focused on AI in November 2023 during a meeting between President Xi and President Biden at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit.
 - The US readout noted that “the leaders affirmed the need to address the risks of advanced AI systems and improve AI safety.”
 - The US Office of Science and Technology Policy Director [called](#) for working with China on global AI safety standards in January.
 - During US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s April trip to China, he [announced](#) that talks on AI would include “risks and safety concerns around advanced AI and how best to manage them.” China also [noted](#) that the AI dialogue would start soon as part of “Five Points of Consensus” with the US.
 - The first meeting will [occur](#) on May 14 in Geneva.



3.1 Multilateral Governance



3.2 Global South

3.3 Bilateral Governance

3.4 “Track 1.5” and “Track 2” dialogues: Track 1.5 and 2 dialogues between China and the West have increased over the last year, but there remain some gaps in the landscape.

Frontier AI discussions are a growing but still minor fraction of overall dialogues, and some key stakeholder groups are underrepresented at present.

- Concordia AI created a [database](#) of China–Western Track 1.5 and 2 Dialogues on AI and [analyzed](#) the features of the landscape.
- Of 8 AI-focused dialogues taking place since 2022, only 2 focused on frontier AI safety and governance. This is a small proportion of dialogues, which number at least 40+ just between the US and China.
- Dialogue participants are mainly foreign policy and military experts, with fewer academic scientists, industry representatives, or experts from other domains that intersect with AI risks (e.g. biosecurity and cybersecurity).



*Note each circle is inclusive, e.g. the 8 AI-focused dialogues includes the 2 frontier AI safety and governance dialogues. AI-focused refers to dialogues with AI in the name or appear to be at least 50% focused on AI. AI-related dialogues appear to spend 15-50% of their focus on AI. See table for acronyms.

One frontier AI safety Track 2 dialogue between top Chinese and Western AI scientific and governance experts produced substantive joint declarations on AI safety.

- The International Dialogue for AI Safety (IDAIS) has held 2 meetings in [October 2023](#) and [March 2024](#), convened by top AI scientists including Yoshua Bengio, [Andrew Yao](#) (姚期智), Stuart Russell, and [ZHANG Ya-Qin](#) (张亚勤); some of the same names also [published](#) a joint paper titled “Managing AI Risks in an Era of Rapid Progress” in October.
 - Several Chinese industry representatives and top policy experts also attended the March 2024 meeting.²⁰
- Both meetings resulted in [joint declarations](#) oriented around frontier AI safety risks such as misinformation, misuse by terrorists for developing weapons of mass destruction, and loss of control of AI, which could risk human extinction.



Some strategies Concordia AI has previously proposed for collaboration with China on international AI governance:²¹

- Agree on joint measures to mitigate frontier AI risks, such as making concrete progress on international AI safety standards and evaluations.
- Share ideas for domestic governance mechanisms.
- Accelerate progress on technical safety research through academic collaboration and greater international funding.
- Share benefits of AI widely, such as by ensuring underrepresented languages are included in new LLMs.

THE | DIPLOMAT

THE DEBATE | OPINION

To Prevent an AI Apocalypse, the World Needs to Work With China

China has the desire, foundation, and expertise to work with the global society on mitigating catastrophic risks from advanced AI.

By Jason Zhou, Kwan Yee Ng , and Brian Tse

February 01, 2024

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Overview of key developments since October 2023

- Top **national leaders** are simultaneously promoting faster AI development and stronger safety/security, without apparent focus on frontier AI safety issues.
- China's **regulatory system** for AI was already relatively mature by 2023. While that has not expanded since, **other national policies** are incorporating frontier AI concerns.
- China had created **national science and technology (S&T) ethics reviews** for AI in 2023, but there have been few recent updates.
- New domestic **standards** have been issued on AI safety and security. They mainly address content security concerns but also acknowledge frontier AI risks.
- 3 additional **local governments** have issued policies to promote **AGI (artificial general intelligence) or large model** development while including some safety provisions, following a similar policy from the Beijing Municipal Government in May 2023.

4.1 Overarching national guidance: Top national leaders have not publicly prioritized AI safety any further, though experts have included provisions relevant to frontier safety in their drafts of the national AI law.

4.2 National regulations and policies

4.3 Science and technology ethics system

4.4 Voluntary standards

4.5 Local government action

The 2024 Government Work Report and field investigations by national leaders reveal interest in frontier AI development and AI-driven applications, but little focus on safety.

- The 2024 Government Work Report ([En](#), [Ch](#)), issued at the Two Sessions (China's premier annual political gathering), included a new "AI+" initiative focused on applications, but had no [mentions](#) of AGI, large models, or fundamental AI research.²²
- Around the Two Sessions, separate field [visits](#) to AI labs by Premier Li Qiang and the head of China's macroeconomic planner (NDRC) showed increased interest in frontier AI.
 - Public materials on the visits only included a brief reference to AI safety in a [presentation slide](#) by the Beijing Academy of AI (BAAI) for Premier Li.
- One other mention of safety was in an interview on the sidelines of the Two Sessions with Foreign Minister Wang Yi. While [discussing](#) AI governance, Minister Wang referenced the need to ensure human control of AI.

China does not view capabilities development and safety/security as zero-sum, simultaneously increasing efforts in both directions.

- MOST Minister YIN Hejun's (阴和俊) [essay](#) in a CAC-overseen magazine highlights the complexity and ambivalence of these views.
 - The essay argues that AI is key to national power, as the “largest variable in the restructuring of overall national competitiveness and the new focus of global great power competition.”
 - Yin called for improving the AI governance system under the idea that “development is the greatest security” and also to put “equal emphasis on development and governance.”²³
 - At the same time, he supports promoting AI ethics and expanding international cooperation on AI governance.
- A separate sign of the government's complex views on AI development and safety is the mid-2023 relaxation of [interim regulations on generative AI](#) after industry feedback on the restrictive [first draft](#).
 - The revisions sent a signal that the government supports capabilities development.
 - However, the current Chinese regulations create meaningful compliance costs for companies not seen in most other countries. These regulations also allow regulators to experiment with tools that could be used to regulate frontier AI.

China is in the process of developing a national AI law, and 2 separate expert drafts have been released to date.

- After the national AI law was first [announced](#) in June 2023, it was not directly mentioned in two subsequent National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee [planning documents](#).
- However, the 2024 State Council legislative work plan issued in May [listed](#) the AI law as “under preparations” for submission to the NPC Standing Committee’s review. The NPC Standing Committee’s plan also [noted](#) that laws and regulations relating to AI were under preparation.
- Meanwhile, Chinese experts continue to draft their own suggested versions of the AI law, and the NPC Standing Committee recently [held](#) a seminar on AI with an expert calling for accelerated development of the AI Law.
 - Experts from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) led drafting of a [1.0 version](#) “Model Law” in August 2023 and a [2.0 version](#) in April 2024.²⁴
 - [ZHANG Linghan](#) (张凌寒), a member of the UN High-Level Advisory Body on AI and professor at China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL), led a separate “[expert suggestion draft](#)” published in March 2024.²⁵ This draft was later [discussed](#) at a meeting attended by the NPC Legislative Affairs Commission, CAC, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and MOST.

Both expert drafts orient around promoting AI development and also contain provisions relevant to frontier AI safety.

Key provisions	<u>CASS-led draft</u>	<u>CUPL-led draft</u>
Licensing requirement for models with certain risky profiles ²⁶		
New government agency for AI ²⁷		
Tax credits for “safety governance” research or equipment ²⁸		
Specialized oversight for foundation models above a certain (unspecified) size ²⁹		
Provision on AGI value alignment ³⁰		
Financial penalties for violations by AI developers ³¹		
Liability exemptions for open-source AI ³²		

4.1 Overarching national guidance

4.2 National regulations and policies: National scientific funding has begun devoting greater attention to AI safety, but no new regulations have emerged on AI safety.

4.3 Science and technology ethics system

4.4 Voluntary standards

4.5 Local government action

Over the past 6 months, China has not issued any new binding regulations relating to frontier AI.

- Generative AI applications in China, including leading LLMs like Baidu’s ERNIE Bot and Zhipu AI’s ChatGLM families, continue to be governed by a security review and government registration system.
 - Under the existing regulatory regime, at least 117 [generative AI products](#) and over 900 deep synthesis algorithms have been registered with government authorities since August 2023.³³

Registration Information for Generative AI Services (as of March 2024)

Order	Location	Model name	Registering company	Registration number	Time of registration
1	Beijing	ERNIE Bot (文心一言)	Baidu	Beijing-WenXinYiYan-20230821	2023/8/31
2	Beijing	ChatGLM (智谱清言)	Zhipu AI	Beijing-ChatGLM-20230821	2023/8/31
3	Beijing	Skylark (云雀大模型)	ByteDance	Beijing-YunQue-20230821	2023/8/31

The National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) announced that it is accepting applications for the first projects on value alignment.

Institution	Date	Total Funding	Safety proportion	Types of safety research the grant can support
NSFC	Dec 2023	3 million RMB (~\$400,000)	2 of 6 research directions	Large model value and safety alignment strategy; automated evaluation methods including safety and security.
NSFC	Mar 2024	20 million RMB (~\$2.8 million)	1 of 11 research directions	Data poisoning, backdoor attacks, adversarial samples, and evaluating fairness and reliability. Similar calls were issued in 2022 and 2023 .
NSFC	Mar 2024	2.6 million RMB per project (~\$360,000)	1 of 19 research directions with China Unicom	Large speech synthesis models, including value alignment and bias.

Chinese national security officials and organizations have become more publicly vocal about AI's threats to national security, including brief references to AI safety risks.

- An engineer in the Central Military Commission Political and Legal Affairs Committee [stated](#) that loss of control of AI could be an existential risk for humanity, in an article mainly discussing generative AI's threat to political security, military security, cybersecurity, and economic security.
- The Minister of the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the MSS official WeChat account have both written on AI, primarily discussing AI security issues, but also with references to AI cyberattacks and data poisoning that fall within our scope of AI safety.
 - The MSS Minister [argued](#) in September 2023 that generative AI such as ChatGPT “is frequently an important tool for cognitive and public opinion warfare.”
 - An MSS WeChat [post](#) in November was focused on AI's national security challenges, discussing “data theft,” “cyberattacks,” “economic security,” “data poisoning,” and “military security.”
 - An MSS WeChat [post](#) in January 2024 listed AI alongside the quantum, space, deep sea, and biological domains as areas of “non-traditional security,” a term which suggests [increased interest](#) in international cooperation.



A government-affiliated think tank discussed AI risks and recommended value alignment.

- The China Academy of Information and Communications Technology's (CAICT) November 2023 [Blue Paper on Large Model Governance](#) noted the risk of large models causing catastrophic results from loss of control.
 - While the report focused more on information security and fake information, large model robustness, interpretability, and loss of control were also discussed.
 - The paper also supported using RLHF to pursue value alignment.
- CAICT is a Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT)-overseen public institution, and previous CAICT leaders have become government officials.

4.1 Overarching national guidance

4.2 National regulations and policies

4.3 Science and technology ethics system: There have been no policy updates on S&T ethics reviews, and little new information has emerged on how these are operationalized within companies and research institutions.

4.4 Voluntary standards

4.5 Local government action

4.1 Overarching national guidance

4.2 National regulations and policies

4.3 Science and technology ethics system

4.4 Voluntary standards: New standards have been issued on AI safety and security. They currently prioritize content security, but there is growing interest in frontier capabilities and safety testing.

4.5 Local government action

Government standards bodies have begun work on standards that could be relevant for frontier AI safety, and industry actors are also pursuing safety benchmarks.

- The Standardization Administration of China (SAC) and MIIT have [both called](#) for work on AI standards.
 - In December 2023, SAC [announced](#) that work was beginning on 7 AI-related standards, including one on “Risk Management Capability Assessment” and one titled “Pretrained Model Part 2: Testing Indicators and Methods.” These could include provisions relevant to frontier AI safety.
- Industry associations, such as the AI Industry Alliance of China (AIIA) are pursuing their own standards related to AI safety, such as an [AI Risk Management Framework](#) and [AI Safety Benchmark](#) (see the Lab and Industry Practices [section](#) for more details).
- A laboratory under MIIT has also issued [certifications](#) to some leading AI developers including Zhipu AI and Baidu, primarily testing model capabilities, but a new round of evaluations dubbed “[Fangsheng](#)” will include testing for value alignment.³⁴

China finalized its first national standard on generative AI security in February, focused on content security with a brief mention of frontier safety risks.

- The [generative AI security standard](#) was issued by TC260, a standards body for cybersecurity under SAC, finalizing a draft from October 2023.³⁵ It will likely guide implementation of security assessments required for generative AI under the July 2023 [interim measures for generative AI](#).
- The document makes reference to “long-term” AI risks, such as deception, self-replication, use in cyberattacks or biological or chemical weapons, but has no concrete measures for these risks.
- The bulk of the standard focuses on content security concerns, such as corpus origin, corpus content, corpus watermarking, and model security (i.e. safety of content generated by the model).
 - The standard sets concrete quantitative tests for compliance, such as testing at least 4,000 samples from the data corpus for compliance (requiring a 96% compliance rate).

4.1 Overarching national guidance

4.2 National regulations and policies

4.3 Science and technology ethics system

4.4 Voluntary standards

4.5 Local government action: Local government policies focused on AI development also touch on frontier safety issues, such as strengthening risk foresight, safety testing for models, and promoting model alignment.

Most of the key provincial-level jurisdictions for AI have released policies on AGI or large models.

- China's 3 economic megaregions, Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze River Delta, and Greater Bay Area, are home to over 80% of China's AI innovation and development and also feature recent local government policies on frontier AI.³⁶
 - Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong (leading each of these respective regions) have all issued AGI or large model policies in the last year.
 - Zhejiang, in the Yangtze River Delta region, issued an AI development policy in late 2023.
- Outside these regions, in the last year, Anhui has also issued an AGI policy, and Fujian has issued an AI development policy.
- These policies focus on development, but also contain AI safety-relevant measures that could foreshadow national policies, given China's common practice of testing out policies first at the local level.

Testing of frontier AI safety measures in the provinces could inform and foreshadow future national actions.

Safety-relevant measures	<u>Anhui</u>	<u>Beijing</u>	<u>Fujian</u>	<u>Guangdong</u>	<u>Shanghai</u>	<u>Zhejiang</u>
Alignment	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗
Early warning of risks/disasters	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
International cooperation	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗
Pre-deployment supervision	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
S&T ethics	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Safety or security testing and evaluation	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗
Watermarking and provenance	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗

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Overview of key developments since October 2023


- **Industry alliances**, particularly the AI Industry Alliance of China (AIIA), have substantially increased interest in AI safety, including holding a seminar on AGI risks and pursuing concrete projects on evaluations and benchmarks.
- **New models from SHLAB, Zhipu AI, and DeepSeek** were accompanied by explanations of their respective safety practices, which include RLHF alignment that prioritizes human intentions and preventing damaging content without much attention to frontier safety risks.
- **Corporate internal AI ethics and governance practices** remain largely a black box. Nevertheless, reports by Tencent and Alibaba indicate growing understanding of frontier AI risks, and Ant Group claims to devote a substantial portion of AI R&D resources to ethics.

5.1 Industry alliance projects: At least 2 influential industry alliances are actively engaged in initiatives on AI safety, security, and governance.

5.2 Safety of published models

5.3 Corporate ethics and governance work

AIIA and the Cyber Security Association of China (CSAC) are major government-backed players pursuing projects on AI safety, security, and governance.³⁷



- - - - -> Oversees
- <- . . . -> Works closely with
- Directly subordinated to

Thus far, AIIA's Safety and Security Governance Committee has been the most active on frontier safety, though the Policy and Law working group has also shown interest.

- AIIA is overseen by 4 central government departments and works closely with the government-affiliated CAICT think tank. The key committees or working groups for AI safety are:
 - Safety and Security Governance Committee (安全治理委员会), [announced](#) in September 2023.
 - The committee published an [AI safety benchmark](#), which focuses more on issues of “content security” and “data security” and also tests for 2 aspects of AI “consciousness,” including AI “appealing for rights” and “anti-humanity tendencies.”
 - The committee is also pursuing a standard on the safety of [coding large models](#), working on an [AI risk management framework](#), and exploring a project on [alignment](#).
 - Policy and Law working group (政策法规工作组), which dates from [2017](#).
 - The Policy and Law working group held a [meeting](#) on AGI risks in January, showing new interest in frontier AI safety. It also seems to be participating in the CUPL-led AI Law expert draft, previously discussed [here](#).
 - Science and Technology Ethics working group (科技伦理工作组), [announced](#) in December 2023.

Meanwhile, CSAC has been focused on corpus development, safety or security testing, and multimodal AI.

- CSAC is overseen by the CAC, affording it a close relationship with regulators.
- CSAC [established](#) an AI Safety and Security Governance Expert Committee in October 2023, which is led by the deputy director of the National Computer Network Emergency Response Technical Team/Coordination Center of China (CNCERT/CC), also under CAC.
 - The committee has [released](#) a Chinese basic corpus and conducted unspecified safety/security evaluation work.
 - Given CSAC's role under CAC and the participation of CNCERT/CC, this group seems poised to focus mainly on content security and cybersecurity issues, but many details have not yet been [released](#).



5.1 Industry alliance projects

5.2 Safety of published models: Over the past 6 months, 3 additional labs released details about safety measures for models they published, but they appear to have taken little action on frontier AI safety.

5.3 Corporate ethics and governance work

SHLAB, Zhipu AI, and DeepSeek's disclosures reveal some efforts to align models to human intentions and prevent toxic content, but not testing for more frontier risks.

- SHLAB [claimed](#) to apply a novel RLHF approach on InternLM2 to reduce reward hacking.
 - However, the technical report does not indicate how SHLAB measures success in reducing reward hacking, and SHLAB's benchmarks test primarily against performance, without testing against safety benchmarks.
- Zhipu AI [released](#) a paper on their use of RLHF methods in the ChatGLM family, but primarily focus on intent alignment.
 - Their definition of safety focuses on harmful content, toxic content, and content that could provoke controversy, rather than frontier safety issues.
 - Zhipu AI Chief Scientist TANG Jie (唐杰) [stated](#) that he is pursuing work on “superalignment” to ensure that AI will be aligned with human values and can conduct self-reflection, but Zhipu has not yet released any public research papers on superalignment.
- DeepSeek's technical paper for the DeepSeek-V2 model [claims](#) that DeepSeek's ultimately objective is alignment with human values. However, concrete safety measures in their model are lacking.
 - The paper does not discuss testing alignment against any safety benchmarks.

5.1 Industry alliance projects

5.2 Safety of published models

5.3 Corporate ethics and governance work: Details about how companies implement AI ethics and governance measures are largely unknown, though Ant Group asserts it has made significant investments. Other companies have produced reports analyzing frontier AI risks.

Ant Group claims that 20% of its large model technical personnel work on S&T ethics, but this is difficult to verify.

- Ant Group Senior Vice President and Chairman of the Technology Strategy Committee NI Xingjun (倪行军) [claimed](#) in December 2023 that:
 - Nearly 20% of the large model technical team works on ethics construction.
 - Ant Group has invested human resources and compute into creating risk assessment and defense mechanisms for large models.
- While it is not currently possible to independently verify these claims, this may indicate that Chinese companies are incentivized to improve safety practices.
- Ant Group's substantial participation in a WDTA [standard](#) on LLM security testing released in April – all of the “Lead Authors” listed were from Ant Group – does partially back up their claims.

Recent reports by commercial actors have also begun to discuss frontier AI risks in greater sophistication and lay out company efforts to combat such risks.

- [Alibaba](#) and [Tencent](#) published reports in December and January that substantially explored frontier AI safety and governance issues. We were not aware of any major reports from labs discussing the issue previously.
 - Alibaba's paper discussed robustness, embedding human values, and watermarking mechanisms.
 - Tencent's paper had a full chapter on large model value alignment, noting OpenAI's allocation of resources to superalignment and scalable oversight research.
- Baidu's security/safety team wrote an [article](#) on red-teaming in April.
 - The article frames red-teaming primarily in terms of content security, referencing China's regulations and standards on generative AI.
 - It also discusses preventing jailbreak attacks and GPT-4's red-teaming against alignment, disinformation, and biological misuse.



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Overview of key developments since October 2023

- A small but influential group of Chinese experts in dialogue with foreign scholars came to a **consensus on AI “red lines”** that must not be crossed in order to avoid existential risks.
- The idea of devoting a **minimum level of AI R&D funding to safety, governance, or ethics**, which previously was essentially absent from Chinese discourse, has gained support, particularly within this small set of influential experts.
- Multiple experts have begun to write on the **risks of AI for biological security** for the first time.
- While many previous discussions of frontier AI risks occurred at leading AI conferences, now some experts are discussing these risks in **venues directed towards government and party officials**.

6.1 International coordination: Top Chinese and foreign experts have signed a consensus statement on key aspects of frontier AI risks, policy recommendations, and red lines in a recent dialogue.

6.2 R&D funding devoted to AI safety

6.3 AI and biological security

6.4 Discussion in party venues

The 2 IDAIS meetings show that a number of influential Chinese and Western experts agree on measures for ensuring safety of frontier AI models.

- For more on [IDAIS](#), see the International Governance [section](#).
- Joint policy recommendations include developing “red lines,” mandating registration of models above a certain capability, and increasing funding for AI safety and governance research.
- Key signatories included former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs FU Ying (傅莹), Tsinghua Institute for AI International Governance (I-AIIG) Dean [XUE Lan](#) (薛澜), BAAI leadership, Zhipu AI CEO ZHANG Peng (张鹏), and ByteDance Head of Research LI Hang (李航), who signed in a personal capacity.
- The five [red lines](#) agreed upon in Beijing were:
 1. autonomous replication or improvement;
 2. power seeking;
 3. assisting weapon development;
 4. cyberattacks;
 5. deception.

6.1 International coordination

6.2 R&D funding devoted to AI safety: The idea of devoting a minimum level of national and corporate R&D funding to AI safety or governance research has received some attention and support in Chinese domestic discourse.

6.3 AI and biological security

6.4 Discussion in party venues

Kai-Fu Lee and several other leading Chinese AI experts expressed support for minimum funding or resourcing levels for AI safety.

- Both IDAIS readouts and the “[Managing AI Risks](#)” paper called for a minimum of one-third of corporate and government AI R&D funds to be spent on AI safety and governance.
- Investor and 01.AI founder [Kai-Fu Lee](#) (李开复), Tsinghua dean and former Baidu President [ZHANG Ya-Qin](#) (张亚勤), and Founding Chairman of BAAI [ZHANG Hongjiang](#) (张宏江) all support companies allocating a minimum level of staff or funding for AI safety issues, listing figures between 10% and 20%.
- The Senior Vice President of Ant Group [Ni Xingjun](#) (倪行军) claims that nearly 20% of technical personnel in Ant’s large model team already work on ethics issues.
- The CASS [AI model law](#) suggests providing tax credits for safety and governance work by AI developers and providers.



6.1 International coordination

6.2 R&D funding devoted to AI safety

6.3 AI and biological security: There is nascent discussion in policy advisory circles about the risks of AI combined with biological risks.

6.4 Discussion in party venues

While these discussions are nascent, all actors who have weighed in are influential policy advisors.

- Tianjin University Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy Director ZHANG Weiwen (张卫文) [said](#) in October 2023 that it is important to develop talent to manage risks from AI combined with synthetic biology.
 - The Tianjin center is perhaps China's foremost university center [researching](#) biosafety and security.
- A researcher at the Development Research Center of the State Council (DRC) [discussed](#) biosecurity risks from LLMs and biological design tools in a January 2024 article.
 - DRC is a think tank subordinated to China's cabinet, the State Council.
- A CAICT report [cited](#) the [interim report](#) of the UN High-Level Advisory Body on AI, including references to AI's chemical and biological risks, as well as the possibility of replacement of human values and knowledge.
 - CAICT is a public institution overseen by MIIT.

6.1 International coordination

6.2 R&D funding devoted to AI safety

6.3 AI and biological security

6.4 Discussion in party venues: Warnings regarding the potential risks of frontier AI have also begun to arise in venues directed more towards party elites than scientific audiences.

2 leading experts discussed frontier AI safety risks in notable party venues in recent months.

- Academician [GAO Wen](#) (高文) penned [2 articles](#) for newspapers under the Central Party School and the Communist Party of China (CPC) Publicity Department in November and December.³⁸
 - Gao had previously given a [presentation](#) on AI to President Xi and other top leaders in 2018.
 - In the new articles, Gao noted the risk of AGI leading to “extinction of humanity” and calls for ensuring safety, controllability, and alignment of AI.
- Beijing Institute for General Artificial Intelligence (BIGAI) director ZHU Songchun (朱松纯) also mentioned AGI risks in a [speech](#) for delegates to the top national political advisory body, the China People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).
 - Zhu discussed paths to realizing AGI, China’s competitive advantages, and risks of loss of control.
 - He also called for giving AGI a value system and cognitive structure, creating a “[heart](#)” in the machine, so that it is aligned with human values and norms.³⁹



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Overview of key developments since October 2023

- Polls remain of limited quality. None have fully representative samples, and the ones that tackle frontier AI safety questions are not at all representative.
- The public still seem* to view benefits of AI as outweighing the risks.
- The public still seem* to think that frontier AI development could cause human extinction, but also seem to think that the risks are controllable.

*These conclusions should be treated with caution due to the lack of representative polls.

There was only one new relevant poll over the past six months, which did not yield any clarifying results.

- The [poll](#) was conducted in early March 2024 by The Paper (澎湃新闻).⁴⁰
 - The Paper is a state-backed Chinese media outlet, notable in the past for investigative work.
 - The sample in this poll was not representative of the population, with over two-thirds of respondents under the age of 35.
 - The poll found that 63% of respondents agree that AI's continued development might lead to loss of control. However, it is not clear what was meant by "loss of control," and the poll did not ask how respondents would balance the benefits and dangers of AI.




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Thank you for reading our report!

- We appreciate your support and welcome questions, feedback, and other follow-up engagement. Feel free to reach out to us directly at info@concordia-ai.com.
- In addition to the report, we have compiled several running databases that may be helpful for researchers of China and AI safety.
 - Appendix A: [China's AI Governance Documents](#), a running list including both domestic and international governance documents.
 - Appendix B: [Chinese Technical AI Safety Database](#), with a list of Chinese Frontier AI Safety Papers and Key Chinese AI Safety-relevant Research Groups.

Key acronyms (I)

AGI	Artificial General Intelligence	通用人工智能
AIIA	Artificial Intelligence Industry Alliance of China	人工智能产业发展联盟
BAAI	Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence	北京智源人工智能研究院
BIGAI	Beijing Institute for General Artificial Intelligence	北京通用人工智能研究院
CAC	Cyberspace Administration of China	网信办
CAICT	China Academy of Information and Communications Technology	中国信息通信研究院
CAIS	Center for AI Safety	人工智能安全中心
CAISG	Peking University Center for AI Safety and Governance	人工智能安全与治理中心
CASS	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences	中国社会科学院
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear	化学、生物、放射和核
CNCERT/C C	National Computer Network Emergency Response Technical Team/Coordination Center of China	国家计算机网络应急技术处理协调中心

Key acronyms (2)

CoAI	Tsinghua Conversational AI research group	交互式人工智能 课题组
CPC	Communist Party of China	中国共产党
CSAC	Cyber Security Association of China	中国网络空间安全协会
CUPL	China University of Political Science and Law	中国政法大学
CVDA	Peking University Computer Vision and Digital Art Lab (CVDA lab)	计算机视觉与数字艺术实验室
DRC	Development Research Center	国务院发展研究中心
GAIR	Shanghai Jiao Tong University Generative Artificial Intelligence Research Lab	生成式人工智能研究组
HKUST	Hong Kong University of Science and Technology	香港科技大学
I-AIIG	The Institute for AI International Governance of Tsinghua University	清华大学人工智能国际治理研究院

Key acronyms (3)

IDAIS	International Dialogues on AI Safety	人工智能安全国际对话
LLM	Large Language Model	大语言模型
MIIT	Ministry of Industry and Information Technology	工信部
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	外交部
MOST	Ministry of Science and Technology	科技部
MSRA	Microsoft Research Asia	微软亚洲研究院
MSS	Ministry of State Security	国安部
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission	发改委
NPC	National People's Congress	全国人民代表大会
NSFC	National Natural Science Foundation of China	国家自然科学基金委员会
PAIR	PKU Alignment and Interaction Lab	北大AI对齐团队
RLHF	Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback	人类反馈强化学习

Key acronyms (4)

SAC	Standardization Administration of China	中国标准化管理委员会
SHJT	Shanghai Jiao Tong University	上海交通大学
SHLAB	Shanghai Artificial Intelligence Laboratory	上海人工智能实验室
TC260	National Information Security Standardization Technical Committee, or National Technical Committee 260 on Cybersecurity of Standardization Administration of China	全国信息安全标准化技术委员会
THUNLP	Natural Language Processing Lab at Tsinghua University	清华大学自然语言处理与社会人文计算实验室
TJUNLP	Tianjin University Natural Language Processing Laboratory	天津大学自然语言处理实验室
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly	联合国大会
WAIC	World Artificial Intelligence Conference	世界人工智能大会

Endnotes (I)

1. The graphic is slightly modified from the UK government's graphic in the [AI Safety Summit: introduction \(HTML\)](#). For more information on how the report is scoped, please see page 4 of our [2023 State of AI Safety in China report](#).
2. For more information on this distinction, see pages 4-5 of our [2023 State of AI Safety in China report](#).
3. We use the terms preprint and paper interchangeably in this section.
4. The machine learning conferences we counted are NeurIPS, ICML, ICLR, ACL, EMNLP, CVPR, ICCV, ECCV, and AISTATS, based on our understanding of which conferences are commonly considered top tier at present.
5. Based on our database, with data through April 30.
6. Based on our database. Sample size: 131.

Endnotes (2)

7. We removed Alibaba DAMO Academy, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST) FU Jie (付杰) research team, Huawei Noah's Ark Lab, RealAI, and Shanghai Jiao Tong University Lab for Interpretability and Theory-Driven Deep Learning. Though they have all continued publishing on frontier AI safety, the frequency was not sufficient to meet our new bar.
8. While the CVDA lab and THUNLP met our criteria for inclusion, their labs have a less clearly-articulated focus on safety than the other new additions.
9. State-backed labs are public-private partnerships, such as Shanghai AI Lab (SHLAB), Beijing Academy of AI (BAAI), and Beijing Institute of General AI (BIGAI), which receive government funding and often collaborate with local universities.
10. While there is frontier AI safety research occurring at universities and companies in China's third major AI hub of Shenzhen - Guangdong - Hong Kong, our strict data-coding requirements excluded several researchers in the region who have written papers on AI safety.

Endnotes (3)

11. See the Key Chinese AI Safety-relevant Research Groups sheet of the [Chinese Technical AI Safety Database](#) for full details.

MSRA is Microsoft Research Asia. SHLAB is Shanghai AI Lab. PKU CAISG / PAIR is the Peking University Center for AI Safety and Governance and the PKU Alignment Interaction Lab, both represented by YANG Yaodong (杨耀东). SHJT GAIR is Shanghai Jiao Tong University Generative AI Research Lab. CoAI is Tsinghua Conversational AI Group, which along with Tsinghua Foundation Model Research Center, is represented by HUANG Minlie. THUNLP is Tsinghua University Natural Language Processing Lab.

12. Graphic source: [Aligner: Achieving Efficient Alignment through Weak-to-Strong Correction](#).
13. Graphic source: [Large Language Model Unlearning](#).
14. Graphic source: [Agent Alignment in Evolving Social Norms](#).
15. Graphic source: [Control Risk for Potential Misuse of Artificial Intelligence in Science](#).
16. Graphic source: [Can ChatGPT Detect DeepFakes? A Study of Using Multimodal Large Language Models for Media Forensics](#).

Endnotes (4)

17. Graphic source: [SALAD-Bench: A Hierarchical and Comprehensive Safety Benchmark for Large Language Models](#).
18. Graphic source: [Masked Completion via Structured Diffusion with White-Box Transformers](#).
19. Track 2 dialogues involve purely non-governmental participants, while Track 1.5 dialogues involve participation of government as well as civil society or the scholarly community.
20. Key governance figures included former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs FU Ying (傅莹) and Tsinghua Institute for AI International Governance (I-AIIG) dean XUE Lan (薛澜). Apart from BAAI leaders, the CEO of Zhipu AI signed the statement, as did a top scientist at ByteDance, who signed in a personal capacity. This is the first time the latter two publicly expressed major concerns about frontier AI risks.
21. These suggestions were originally published in an op-ed in [the Diplomat](#).
22. The Government Work Report is an annual summary of work priorities for the Chinese government, issued at the Two Sessions, which are the annual meeting of China's legislature and political advisory body.

Endnotes (5)

23. A small number of Chinese AI experts have also argued that “not developing AI is the biggest insecurity” (不发展才是最大的不安全) to support accelerating development. For instance, this view has been expressed by cybersecurity company Qihoo 360 CEO [ZHOU Hongyi](#) (周鸿祎) as well as Academician of the European Academy of Sciences and Tsinghua Professor [SUN Maosong](#) (孙茂松). However, even these experts caveat their support for development, with Zhou saying that safety cannot be ignored for the sake of development, and Sun calling for developing better governance tools.
24. The CASS-led draft included 20 participants from a number of other universities, think tanks, and companies in China. See their draft for the full list.
25. The CUPL-led draft included 7 participants from other Chinese universities and think tanks. See their draft for the full list.
26. For licensing requirement, see CASS draft Chapter 3.
27. For new government agency for AI, see CASS draft Article 12 and CUPL draft Article 59.
28. For tax credits for safety governance research, see CASS draft Article 22.
29. For specialized oversight for foundation models, see CASS draft Article 46 and CUPL draft Articles 50-57.

Endnotes (6)

30. For provision on AGI alignment, see CUPL draft Article 77.
31. For financial penalties, see CASS draft Articles 66-70 and CUPL draft Articles 82-83.
32. For open-source AI liability exemptions, see CASS draft Article 71 and CUPL draft Article 95. The CUPL draft also excludes scientific R&D from the scope (Article 95), while the CASS draft does not (Article 2).
33. The sources for five batches of deep synthesis algorithm filings can be found at the following links. June 2023: [41](#). August 2023: [110](#). January 2024: [129](#). February 2024: [266](#). April 2024: [394](#). The information in the table “Registration Information for Generative AI Services (as of March 2024)” is sourced from the [CAC](#), with the first 3 rows of registration information translated into English by Concordia AI.
34. Fangsheng is 方升, named after a [measuring device](#) during the Warring States era.
35. TC260 is the National Information Security Standardization Technical Committee (全国信息安全标准化技术委员会) under SAC.

Endnotes (7)

36. Pre-2023 policies are excluded as they predate ChatGPT and may reflect outdated priorities. Beijing and Shanghai are “directly-administered municipalities” (直辖市) and thus have the same administrative level as a province.
37. AIIA was created by MIIT, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), MOST, and CAC. CAICT is overseen by MIIT and works closely with AIIA. AIIA has a number of working groups and committees beyond the three listed in this diagram. CSAC is overseen by CAC. The AI Safety and Security Governance Expert Committee is one of two expert committees [established](#) by CSAC.
38. Gao’s articles ran in the [Study Times](#) (学习时报), under the Central Party School, and [Current Events Report](#) (时事报道), under the CPC Publicity Department.
39. Zhu's idea of a “heart” in the machine is [informed](#) in part by traditional Chinese philosophy.
40. A shorter summary of the polling report can be found [here](#). The graphic is from The Paper’s report, with Concordia AI’s translation of the relevant Chinese text. The polling was conducted by The Paper’s [Alignment Lab](#) (澎湃新闻·对齐 Lab), which appears to be a unit or content stream within The Paper writing news articles on AI issues, including on AI’s societal impact. They have written regular articles starting in March 2024.

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About Concordia AI (安远AI)

- Concordia AI is a certified social enterprise based in Beijing, the only social enterprise in China focused on AI safety and governance.
- Controlling and steering increasingly advanced AI systems is a critical challenge for our time.
- Concordia AI aims to ensure that AI is developed and deployed in a way that is safe and aligned with global interests.



We have 3 main areas of work. See our [2023 Annual Review](#) for more details.

Focus 1:
Advising on Chinese AI
safety and governance

- Selected as **deputy chief expert** of AI Safety Governance Committee in China's **Artificial Intelligence Industry Alliance**.
- Co-authored report "**Responsible Open-Sourcing of Foundation Models**."

Focus 2:
Technical AI safety
field-building in China

- Co-hosted a full-day forum on AI Safety and Alignment during the **Beijing Academy of AI (BAAI) conference** in June 2023.
- Organized the first AI Safety and Alignment **Fellowship program** in China.

Focus 3:
Promoting international
cooperation

- Attended the **Global AI Safety Summit** at Bletchley Park.
- Launched and published the bi-weekly **AI Safety in China Newsletter**, with over 700 subscribers from AI labs, governments, think tanks, and media publications.

Conflicts of interest

- Concordia AI is an independent institution, not affiliated to or funded by any government or political group.
- Concordia AI actively participates in and advises on AI safety within China through various channels, including hosting forums, organizing lectures, and advising on policy.
 - Our work in this field places us in a unique position to understand and analyze information regarding the state of AI safety in China.
 - In the course of operations, we have received consulting fees from various companies in mainland China, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
- Nevertheless, we believe our findings are the result of objective analysis, and we disclose this potential conflict to readers for full transparency. No financial engagement with these companies was related to this report's creation.

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